Summary of the opinions of the Attorney General, 2005 by unknown
COUNTIES AND COUNTY OFFICERS; PUBLIC RECORDS; Auditor’s duty to file claims. 
Iowa Code §§ 22.1, 22.2, 22.7, 331.401, 331.504 (2003).  Iowa Code chapter 22 addresses public
access to governmental records, but does not govern the filing or retention of public records. 
The county board of supervisors is responsible for determining whether the documentation
accompanying a claim against the county provides sufficient information regarding the basis of
the claim to justify payment.  (Grady to Cozine, Cherokee County Attorney, 2-22-05) #05-2-2 
February 22, 2005
Mark R. Cozine
Cherokee County Attorney
427 West Main
P.O. Box 100
Cherokee, Iowa   51012
Dear Mr. Cozine:
You have requested an opinion regarding a practice under which county law enforcement
officials retain itemized telephone call records, rather than providing the records to the county
auditor when a request for payment of the claim is submitted.  You ask whether the practice
violates the Iowa public records law, Iowa Code chapter 22.  We conclude that chapter 22 is not
directly implicated by this practice.  We note itemized call records held by county officials do
fall under the definition of public records and must be made available for public review and
copying upon request.  To the extent that specific entries are eligible for treatment as confidential
under Iowa Code section 22.7, the lawful custodian of the records may redact confidential
information prior to allowing public examination of the records.
As background to your inquiry, you explain that in the past your office and the sheriff
have routinely submitted your telephone billing statements with complete itemized call records
to the county auditor when requesting payment.  The itemized call records included information
regarding “cell phone calls and long distance calls to and from confidential informants.”  Your
concerns arose when you learned that an individual went to the auditor’s office and made a
public records request for copies of the itemized call records covering a period of time.  Without
notice to you or to the sheriff, the auditor allowed the individual to copy the records.  You
indicate that the auditor “took the position the records are public information once submitted
with claims for payment.”  In light of a belief that the itemized call records included information
which should be treated as confidential, you and the sheriff determined that the itemized call
records would no longer be provided to the auditor.  The auditor has expressed concern that lack
of submission of the itemized telephone records to the auditor’s office violates chapter 22. 
Therefore, you ask whether retention of itemized telephone records by your office and the
sheriff’s office violates the public records law. 
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Iowa Code chapter 22 (2003) establishes the right of the public to access and copy
governmental records.  Section 22.1(3) defines "public records" to include "all records,
documents, tapes, or other information, stored or preserved in any medium . . . ."  Section
22.1(2) defines "lawful custodian" as "the government body currently in physical possession of
the public record."  Section 22.2 provides that "[e]very person shall have the right to examine
and copy public records . . . ." See generally Iowa Code § 4.1(30)(a) (2003) ( "shall" in statute
imposes a duty). 
The general rule of disclosure has certain specified exceptions within chapter 22.  Section
22.7 sets forth many categories of records that "shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise
ordered by a court, by the lawful custodian of the records, or by another person duly authorized
to release such information . . . ."  It is possible that certain entries on the itemized call records of
law enforcement agencies may reasonably be treated as confidential records under section 22.7.   
See, e.g., Iowa Code §§ 22.7(5) (peace officer investigative reports generally considered
confidential, and although “immediate facts and circumstances surrounding a crime or incident”
are generally not confidential, the Code provides for confidentiality “in those unusual
circumstances where disclosure would plainly and seriously jeopardize an investigation or pose a
clear and present danger to the safety of an individual”);  22.7(18) (discretionary
communications from persons outside the government generally considered confidential where
“persons would be  discouraged making them . . . if they were available for general public
examination . . . ;” information in such communications is not confidential “to the extent that it
can be disclosed without directly or indirectly indicting the identity of the person . . . making it
or enabling others to ascertain the identity of that person . . . ;” information concerning a crime
or illegal act is not confidential “except to the extent that its disclosure would plainly and
seriously jeopardize a continuing investigation or pose a clear and present danger to the safety of
any person”).  In the event that the lawful custodian of a public record is in doubt regarding
whether the record qualifies for treatment as a confidential record or believes that the
circumstances justify restricting access to otherwise public records, subsection 22.8(4) identifies
mechanisms for resolving these issues.  Section 22.10 sets forth enforcement procedures which
are available to the requestor of a record who believes that public records have been improperly
withheld.
Thus, Iowa Code chapter 22 establishes the right of the public to access governmental
records, delineates many categories of public records which may be maintained as confidential,
and establishes procedures for resolving issues regarding confidentiality and enforcement.  Iowa
Code chapter 22 does not, however, govern the filing or retention of public records.  See Clark v.
Banks, 515 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1994) (finding that county sheriff, in the absence of a statutory duty
to retain firearm permit applications, did not violate chapter 22 by returning the documents to the
applicant after they had been processed) .  Although the auditor, as clerk to the board of
supervisors, maintains records of all board proceedings, including a minute book, warrant book,
and claim register [Iowa Code §§ 331.303; 331.504 (2003)], we find no general duty on the part
of other county officials to file documents for retention by the county auditor.  
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Finally, we note that the practice of county officers retaining itemized call records also
implicates Iowa Code sections 331.401(1)(p) (supervisors’ duty to examine and settle all claims
against the county) and 331.504(8) (auditor’s duty to file claims for presentation to the board
with sufficient itemization to clearly show the basis of the claim)(2003).  We previously
examined the auditor’s duties under section 331.504(8) and determined that the auditor performs
a ministerial function in filing claims with the board and “should not refuse to file a clam for
submission to the board on the basis of his or her belief that the supporting documentation is
inadequate.”  1990 Iowa Op. Att’y. Gen. 64 (# 90-2-2(L) at pp. 2-3) (copy enclosed).  The board
of supervisors is responsible for assessing the adequacy of proof supporting claims.  Id. at p. 3.
Assuming that the telephone billing statements indicating the billing period, basic services
provided, and amount due are provided to the auditor as support for payment of the claims, this
documentation would appear sufficient to “show the basis of the claims,” as contemplated by
section 331.504(8).
In summary, we conclude that Iowa Code chapter 22 does not govern the filing or
retention of public records.  The county board of supervisors is responsible for determining
whether the documentation accompanying a claim against the county provides sufficient
information regarding the basis of the claim to justify payment.  
Sincerely, 
Peter J. Grady
Assistant Attorney General
1  The RHSP promotional materials provided with the opinion request sua sponte raise additional
issues by making repeated references to several unspecified private letter rulings issued by the
Internal Revenue  Service as the legal basis under federal law for the RHSP.  Assuming such
rulings exist, whether they would in fact provide a sufficient legal basis under state law for the
RHSP is beyond the scope of this Attorney General’s opinion.  The same disclaimer attaches to a
purported opinion letter from ICMA-RC’s legal counsel apparently analyzing permissible RHSP
contributions and elections under federal tax law.  We likewise decline to pass on the question of
whether the RHSP otherwise implicates state tax laws or implementing rules. 
COUNTIES AND COUNTY OFFICERS: Employee benefits; sick leave policy.  Iowa
Code §§ 70A.1(3), 70A.23, 509A.6, 509A.7, 509A.13.  Iowa Code chapter 70A is not
applicable to county employees. The county board of supervisors may exercise home rule
authority to establish a policy which allows county employees and elected officials to
receive payment for accrued but unused sick leave and/or vacation time.  Whether a
specific retirement health saving plan is one of the legal entities identified in Iowa Code
sections 509A.6, 509A.7 and 509A.13 is beyond the scope of an Attorney General’s
opinion.  Assuming without deciding that a plan is a legal entity as identified by these
sections, none of these statutes directly limits the source of funds which may be used by
an employee to cover the cost of the benefits the entities identified by these sections
provide.  (Vaudt to Davis, Scott County Attorney, 2-22-05) #05-2-3
February 22, 2005
William E. Davis
Scott County Attorney
Scott County Courthouse
416 West Fourth Street
Davenport, Iowa  52801-1187
Dear Mr. Davis:
A Retirement Health Savings Plan (“RHSP”), offered through the non-profit
International City/County Management Association Retirement Corporation (“ICMA-
RC”) apparently allows public employees at or before retirement to convert their accrued
but unused sick leave and vacation benefits into cash which is then invested in mutual
funds offered by an ICMA-RC controlled affiliate.  This investment is used to fund the
former employee’s financial need for medical benefits during retirement.  You have
requested an opinion from this office addressing whether the RHSP violates certain
provisions of Iowa Code chapters 70A and 509A (2003).  You also ask whether Iowa law
“otherwise does not prohibit” Scott County from adopting the RHSP.  
As to your question arising under chapter 70A, a series of our modern opinions
clearly establishes that this chapter does not apply to county employees.  Consequently
chapter 70A does not affect the legitimacy of the RHSP.  As to your second question, we
decline to determine whether the RHSP qualifies as one of the legal entities identified in
sections 509A.6, 509A.7, and 509A.13.  The answers to this question and to the last
question you pose are both beyond the scope of an Attorney General’s opinion.1  We
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2     Iowa Code section 509A.1 grants governing bodies authority to “establish plans for and
procure group insurance, health or medical service, or health flexible spending accounts as
described in section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”  Although your opinion request
presumes otherwise, the RHSP may not be any of these legal entities.  Furthermore, the RHSP
may not be a “hospital or medical service plan” under section 509A.6, an “existing contract”
under section 509A.7, or “accident, health or hospitalization insurance, or a medical service plan”
under section 509A.13.  The kind of legal entity the RHSP is determines whether and to what
extent the provisions of chapter 509A apply.  If the RHSP does not qualify as one of the legal
entities identified in sections 509A.1, 509A.6, 509A.7 and 509A.13, chapter 509A does not apply
to the RHSP.  Under the analysis assumption made in this opinion, only sections 509A.6, 509A.7
and 509A.13 will be reviewed.
 provide opinions on precise legal questions.  See 61 IAC 1.5(2) (opinion
requests should contain sufficient information to determine the precise legal question
presented).  We do not use the opinion process to conduct generalized reviews of
constitutional and statutory provisions to identify potential legal issues.  1996 Iowa Op.
Att’y Gen. 119 (#96-10-11(L)) (1996 WL 769295); 1992 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 176, 177. 
This limitation is particularly relevant when -- as here -- the subject matter is factually
diverse, involves several different statutory provisions, and implicates a number of legal
arguments. See generally Exira Comm. Sch. Dist. v. State, 512 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Iowa
1994).  
We have previously declined the invitation to pass on the legitimacy of vehicles
akin to the RHSP under section 509A.13, as the answer requires a level of analysis
clearly beyond the scope of an Attorney General’s opinion.  See Iowa Op. Att’y Gen.
#02-5-2 (2002 WL 1617558) (“[W]e are not able to comment on whether any specific
group insurance plan qualifies as ‘accident, health or hospitalization insurance, or a
medical service plan’ subject to the requirements of section 509A.13.  This would require
an analysis of the terms and conditions of the specific plan in question.  Such a factual
analysis is beyond the scope of an Attorney General‘s opinion.  See 61 Iowa Admin.
Code 1.5(3)(c).”)  We reaffirm our prior position here as to section 509A.13 and decline
to express an opinion as to the applicability of sections 509A.6 and 509A.7 to the RHSP
for the same reason.  Whether the RHSP is as a matter of law one of the legal entities
identified by Iowa Code section  509A.6, 509A.7 and 509A.13 is a matter best left to
private counsel with specific expertise in the several substantive areas of Iowa law that
the RHSP may implicate if it in fact is one of the benefits vehicles these sections
identify.2
Accordingly, assuming without deciding that the RHSP is subject to chapter 509A
as one of the legal entities identified by sections 509A.6, 509A.7 and 509A.13, we limit
our analysis under chapter 509A to the following:  whether the collective phrase “at
the/such employee’s own/sole expense” found in these sections permits eligible county
employees prior to or at retirement to convert accrued but unused sick leave and vacation
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into cash value and place the cash in the RHSP to fund post-retirement medical benefits. 
We conclude under this assumption that these provisions do not prohibit the
contemplated conversion.
You initially identify Iowa Code sections 70A.1(3) and 70A.23 as potentially
applicable to the RHSP.  Section 70A.1(3) relevantly provides that “[s]eparation from
State employment shall cancel all unused accrued sick leave.” (Emphasis added.)  It then
explains how eligible State employees can accrue additional vacation time each pay
period through converting accumulated but unused sick leave.  Section 70A.23 articulates
how an eligible State employee can elect, at retirement, to receive a cash payment for
accumulated but unused sick leave.  Neither of these provisions reference county
employees explicitly nor by implication. 
You cite a 1948 opinion from this office as support for your belief that sections
70A.1(3) and 70A.23 apply to county employees.  1948 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 88.  This
opinion concluded that employees of county boards of social welfare were actually state,
rather than county employees, and that because of their status as state employees, state
law regarding vacation, sick leave and working hours applied to these individuals.  1948
Iowa Op. Att’y. Gen. at pp. 90-92.  The nonapplicability of Iowa Code chapter 70A to
county employees has been well-settled by at least four modern AG opinions which
directly address this point.  Each explicitly confirms that chapter 70A (formerly chapter
79) does not apply to county employees.  See 1982 Op. Att’y Gen. 271 (#81-10-9(L))
(1981 WL 315390) (finding that state statutes dealing with sick leave policies (including
chapter 70A) are “inapplicable to the counties”); 1980 Op. Att’y Gen. 359 (#79-8-16(L))
(1979 WL 21049) (limiting application of section 79.1 to eligible state employees and
concluding that county boards of supervisors have authority to establish sick leave policy
for county employees); 1970 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 462, 463 (concluding county boards of
supervisors have the authority to provide vacation and sick leave to county employees at
county’s expense, similar to benefits provided state employees under section 79.1); 1964
Op. Att’y Gen. 118, 119 (concluding that Iowa Code section 79.1—the precursor to
section 70A.1—is inapplicable to county employees because it only references
“employees of the state”, and county boards of supervisors have the sole determination as
to the vacation time and sick leave granted employees under their jurisdiction). 
 In fact, the 1981 and 1979 opinions directly addressed whether a board of
supervisors had authority to establish sick leave policies including provisions allowing
county employees or elected officials to receive payment for accrued sick leave.  We
concluded that the policies addressed in those opinions were within the scope of the
county’s home rule authority.  1982 Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. 271 (#81-10-9(L)) (1981 WL
315390) (board of supervisors found to have authority to establish a sick leave policy for
elected officials which would permit payment for accrued sick leave);  1980 Op. Att’y
Gen. 359 (#79-8-16(L)) (1979 WL 21049) (finding no statutory prohibition restricting the
board of supervisors from establishing a sick leave policy allowing county employees to
receive payment for accrued sick leave).  The ultimate conclusions drawn from this series
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of opinions relevant to the instant opinion request are two-fold:  First, sections 70A.1(3)
and 70A.23 do not apply to the RHSP since chapter 70A does not apply to county
employees.  Second, county boards of supervisors have exclusive home-rule authority to
establish vacation and sick-leave policies for county employees.  In exercising this
authority, the supervisors may establish a policy which allows county elected officials
and employees to receive payment for accrued but unused sick leave and/or vacation
time.  
You also inquire whether sections 509A.6, 509A.7, and 509A.13 preclude a
county employee at or prior to retirement from converting the value of accrued but
unused sick leave and vacation benefits to cash and placing the cash in the RHSP to fund
post-retirement medical benefits.  Each of these sections recognizes that qualified retirees
can continue existing coverage by paying for it themselves:
[A]ny employee [may] continue such life insurance in force
after termination of active service at such employee’s sole
expense. . . .
Iowa Code § 509A.6 (2003) (emphasis added).
This section does not prevent a retired employee over
sixty-five years of age or older from voluntarily continuing
in force, at the employee’s own expense, an existing
contract.
Iowa Code § 509A.7 (2003) (emphasis added).  
[T]he . . . county board of supervisors . . . shall allow its
employees who retire before attaining sixty-five years of
age to continue participation in the group plan or under the
group contract at the employee’s own expense until the
employee attains sixty-five years of age.
Iowa Code § 509A.13 (2003) (emphasis added).  Specifically, you ask whether the
collective phrase “at the/such employee’s own/sole expense” contemplates a retiree’s use
of accrued sick leave or vacation benefits to fund—through the RHSP—the benefits the
legal entities identified by these sections provide.  
As noted above, whether the RHSP qualifies as one of the legal entities
recognized by sections 509A.6, 509A.7 and 509A.13 is beyond the scope of this opinion. 
Assuming without deciding that the RHSP is in fact one of these entities, none of these
provisions places a direct limitation upon the source of funds used by an employee to
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3   However, other sections of chapter 509A may be violated by the RHSP if it is one of the section
509A.6, 509A.7 and 509A.13 identified entities.  Two examples illustrate the potential conundrum.
First, section 509A.4 makes employee participation in any “qualified health care plan” optional.  If
the RHSP is a qualified health care plan under these definitions, the RHSP promotional materials
suggest that the decision to participate in the RHSP, once made, may be an irrevocable election by
the employee or a mandated contribution by the employer.  Both outcomes run counter to the
flexibility section 509A.4 provides employees when considering available employer-offered group
health coverage options.  Second, section 509A.5 requires that the fund supporting administration
of each group plan be “under the control” and be expended “under the direction” of the governing
body.  Through the quoted language the legislature vests a great deal of discretion in the governing
body to determine whether and in what manner a fund will be invested.  By contrast, the RHSP
appears to directly contradict this statutory mandate by removing all discretion and requiring the
monetary value of accrued but unused sick leave and vacation be invested in mutual fund securities
offered by an ICMA-RC controlled affiliate.
   
     There could be other practical state law impediments to a county adopting the RHSP, depending
not only on whether and what kind of legal entity it is under the cited chapter 509A provisions.  For
example, the promotional materials state that Zenith Administrators, Inc., is ICMA-RC’s third-party
administrator (“TPA”) of the claims process under the RHSP.  If the RHSP is determined to be “life
or health insurance coverage or annuities” under Iowa Code section 510.11 (2003) and Zenith cannot
claim an exemption from registration under that section, Zenith would need to register with the Iowa
insurance commissioner prior to administering the claims process.  See Iowa Code § 510.21 (2003)
(“A person shall not act or represent oneself to be an administrator in this state . . . unless the person
holds a current certificate of registration as an administrator issued by the commissioner of
insurance.”) 
cover the cost of the benefits the entities identified by these sections provide.3  We fail to
see how the voluntary use of funds obtained by an eligible employee “cashing out”
accrued but unused sick leave and/or vacation prior to or at retirement and placing it in
the RHSP to fund the benefits upon retirement runs counter to these sections.
The key determination is whether the cost of continuing the benefit is borne soley
by the employee. If all county employees or an identified group of eligible employees are
entitled to receive payment for accrued leave, regardless of RHSP participation, then
investment of the funds received from exercise of this option into the RHSP would
clearly be an expense to the employee.  However, if the county provides the option of
cashing out accrued leave only to those employees who agree to invest the proceeds into
the RHSP, it is possible to conclude that the RHSP is actually being funded by the
county, rather than by the employee.  We believe that it is not the source of the funds, but
the terms of the sick leave or vacation leave policy and the conditions under which an
employee may cash out accrued leave which controls this determination.  As such, this
determination is not appropriate for resolution through an Attorney General’s opinion.  
In summary, Iowa Code chapter 70A is not applicable to county employees. The
county board of supervisors may exercise home rule authority to establish a policy which
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allows county employees and elected officials to receive payment for accrued but unused
sick leave and/or vacation time.  Whether a specific retirement health saving plan is one
of the legal entities identified in Iowa Code sections 509A.6, 509A.7 and 509A.13 is
beyond the scope of an Attorney General’s opinion.  Assuming without deciding that a
plan is a legal entity as identified by these sections, none of these statutes directly limits
the source of funds which may be used by an employee to cover the cost of the benefits
the entities identified by these sections provide. 
Sincerely,
Jeanie K. Vaudt
Assistant Attorney General
PUBLIC HEALTH: Do-not-resuscitate order; Durable medical power of attorney.  Iowa
Code §§ 144A.7A, ch. 144B (2005). The holder of a patient’s durable power of attorney
for health care cannot revoke an out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order unless
designated on the out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order as an individual authorized to
revoke the order.  To the extent that the provisions of chapter 144B relating to durable
powers of attorney for health care conflict with section 144A.7A, the latter prevails with
respect to out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate orders, because it is more specific and
because it is more recently enacted.  (Smith to Eichhorn, State Representative, 6-22-05)
#05-6-1
June 22, 2005
The Honorable George S. Eichhorn
State Representative
3533 Fenton Avenue 
P.O. Box 140 
Stratford, Iowa   50249
Dear Representative Eichhorn:
You have requested an opinion of the Attorney General concerning an apparent
conflict between Iowa Code section 144A.7A(7) which limits revocation of out-of-
hospital do-not-resuscitate orders and the provisions in Iowa Code chapter 144B which
relate to the durable power of attorney for health care.   You point out that under Iowa
Code section 144A.7A(7) an out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order can be revoked only
by a patient or “an individual authorized to act on the patient’s behalf as designated on
the out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order. . . .”   Iowa Code § 144A.7A(7) (2005)
(emphasis added).  In light of this statute, you ask whether an out-of-hospital-do-not-
resuscitate order can be revoked by a patient’s attorney-in-fact who holds a durable
power of attorney for health care purposes, but is not specifically designated in the do-
not-resuscitate order.   Under the express terms of section 144A.7A, the holder of a
patient’s durable power of attorney for health care cannot revoke an out-of-hospital do-
not-resuscitate order unless designated on the order as an individual authorized to revoke
the order.  
The persons authorized to revoke an out-of-hospital-do-not-resuscitate order 
are required to be named in the order under the plain language of Iowa Code section
144A.7A.  Under this statute an out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order “is deemed
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revoked at any time that a patient, or an individual authorized to act on the patient's
behalf as designated on the out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order, is able to
communicate in any manner the intent that the order be revoked, without regard to the
mental or physical condition of the patient.”  Iowa Code § 144A.7A(7) (emphasis added). 
Further, revocation “is only effective as to the health care provider upon communication
to that provider by the patient, an individual authorized to act on the patient's behalf as
designated in the order, or by another person to whom the revocation is communicated.” 
Id.  Any doubt that only a person designated on the order may revoke the order is
resolved by the following subsection which states: “The personal wishes of family
members or other individuals who are not authorized in the order to act on the patient's
behalf shall not supersede a valid out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order.”  Iowa Code §
144A.7A(8) (emphasis added).  
Although this statutory language of chapter 144A seems clear on its face, the
confusion arises when a person serves as a patient’s attorney-in-fact and holds a durable
power of attorney for health care purposes pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 144B, but is
not specifically designated in the do-not-resuscitate order.  A person holding a durable
power of attorney for health care purposes is authorized “to make health care decisions
for the principal if the principal is unable, in the judgment of the attending physician, to
make health care decisions.”  Iowa Code  144B.1(2).   Further, a declaration directing
that life-sustaining procedures be withheld or withdrawn that is “executed by the
principal” pursuant to chapter 144A “shall not otherwise restrict the authority of the
attorney in fact unless either the declaration or the durable power of attorney provides
otherwise.”   Iowa Code § 144B.6(2).  Significantly, there is no counterpart in chapter
144A that preserves the authorization in a durable power of attorney from being
superseded by a out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order.  The legislation enabling out-of-
hospital do-not-resuscitate orders does not include any explicit reference to the
relationship with durable powers of attorney for health care.
Reading the provisions of chapter 144A and 144B together, there is an apparent 
conflict between the authority to revoke an out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order
delineated in chapter 144A and the authority over health care decisions conferred on the
attorney-in-fact under chapter 144B.  Your request asks our office to resolve whether an
attorney-in-fact, who is not designated in the do-not-resuscitate order itself, nevertheless,
retains the authority to make the health care decision to revoke a do-not-resuscitate order. 
Following principles of statutory construction, we must conclude that the failure to
designate the attorney-in-fact as an individual authorized to act on the patient’s behalf on
the out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order operates to limit the authority of an attorney-
Representative George S. Eichhorn
Page 3
in-fact to revoke that order.  Conflicts between general and more specific statutes as well
as conflicts between earlier and more recent statutes are resolved in favor of the more
specific and more recent.  Iowa Code §§ 4.7, 4.8.  See Doe v. Ray, 251 N.W.2d 496, 503
(Iowa 1977).  Applying these criteria, the authority to revoke an out-of-hospital do-not-
resuscitate order would be limited to those persons “authorized to act on the patient’s
behalf as designated on the out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order,” because section
144A.7A is the more specific and the more recent statute.  The 2002 legislation is more
specific insofar as it addresses only the narrow category of health care decisions involved
in out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate orders.  Further, the authority of an attorney-in-fact
conferred under chapter 144B was enacted in 1991.  1991 Iowa Acts, ch. 140, §§ 1-12. 
The limitation on the authority to revoke an out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order to
those persons “authorized to act on the patient’s behalf as designated on the out-of-
hospital do-not-resuscitate order” was enacted in 2002.  2002 Iowa Acts, ch. 1061, § 5. 
The 2002 legislation is the more recent by over ten years. 
Although your request does not inquire about the process by which a patient
consents to issuance of an out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order, we suggest that the
patient’s intent with respect to the effect of any previously-executed durable power of
attorney for health care could be clarified and conflict between chapters 144A and 144B
avoided by modifying the form for out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate orders.  The
provisions in chapter 144A are ambiguous concerning the process by which a  patient
consents to issuance of an out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order.   The ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of a requirement of written consent to issuance of an out-of-
hospital do-not-resuscitate order.   The apparent conflict between chapters 144A and
144B can be avoided by modification of the order form to require written consent with
appropriate certification of the patient’s intent to supersede any previous authorization in
a durable power of attorney for health care.  To explain the rationale for our suggestion,
we examine the statutory authorization for out-of-hospital do-not resuscitate orders in
more detail.
In 2002, the General Assembly amended Iowa Code chapter 144A by adding
provisions authorizing an attending physician to issue an out-of-hospital do-not-
resuscitate order for a patient who is in a terminal condition.  2002 Iowa Acts, ch. 1061,
§ 5.  Administrative rules of the Department of Health refer to out-of-hospital do-not-
resuscitate orders as “OOH DNR” orders, a term we use for convenient reference.  The
authorization for OOH DNR orders in the 2002 amendment of chapter 144A established
an alternative to two other statutory procedures for withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining measures.   Both of those alternatives require written consent of the patient or
a person authorized to act for the patient.
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First, a competent adult may personally execute a “declaration” directing that life-
sustaining procedures be withheld or withdrawn.  Iowa Code § 144A.3.  This is
commonly referred to as a “living will.”  The declaration must be signed by the declarant
in the presence of two witnesses or be duly acknowledged but “may be revoked at any
time and in any manner” by the declarant.  Iowa Code § 144A.3(2). 
Second, life-sustaining measures may be withheld or withdrawn from a patient
who is in a terminal condition and who is comatose, incompetent, or otherwise physically
or mentally incapable of communication and has not made a “declaration” if there is
consultation and written agreement between the attending physician and a person from
one of six classes specified by statute.  Iowa Code §144A.7.  The patient’s attorney-in-
fact designated in writing to make treatment decisions for the patient is given highest
priority to consult with the attending physician and enter a written agreement for
withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures.  Iowa Code § 144A.7(1)(a).
In comparing the statutory authorization for OOH DNR orders with the related
statutes authorizing alternative procedures for withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining
measures, we consider first whether the OOH DNR order enabling legislation requires
consent of the patient or a person acting for the patient.  We consider, also, in what form
the consent is to be given.  The statutory requirements for the OOH DNR order are set
forth in the first three subsections of Iowa Code section 144A.7A, as follows:
1. If an attending physician issues an out-of-hospital do-not-
resuscitate order for an adult patient under this section, the
physician shall use the form prescribed pursuant to subsection
2, include a copy of the order in the patient's medical record,
and provide a copy to the patient or an individual authorized
to act on the patient's behalf. 
2. The department, in collaboration with interested parties,
shall prescribe uniform out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate
order forms and uniform personal identifiers, and shall adopt
administrative rules necessary to implement this section. The
uniform forms and personal identifiers shall be used
statewide. 
3. The out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order form shall
include all of the following: 
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a. The patient's name. 
b. The patient's date of birth. 
c. The name of the individual authorized to act on the
patient's behalf, if applicable.
d. A statement that the patient is in a terminal condition.
e. The physician's signature. 
f. The date the form is signed. 
g. A concise statement of the nature and scope of the order.
h. Any other information necessary to provide clear and
reliable instructions to a health care provider.
Iowa Code § 144A.7A(1)-(3).  Nothing in the quoted text expressly or impliedly requires
consent of the patient or an individual authorized to act for the patient.  The only
signature expressly required by section 144A.7A is by the attending physician.
As directed by subsection 144A.7A(2), the Department of Health has adopted
administrative rules establishing procedures and prescribing a form for the out-of-
hospital do-not-resuscitate order.  641 Iowa Admin. Code 142.   The administrative rules
and prescribed form contemplate that the attending physician will not issue an OOH
DNR order unless the patient “or individual legally authorized to act on the patient’s
behalf” decides that the patient should not be resuscitated.  641 Iowa Admin. Code
142.5(1)(c).  Consistent with the statute, the administrative rules indicate that the OOH
DNR order may be revoked only by the patient or “an individual authorized to act on the
patient’s behalf as designated on the OOH DNR order.”  641 Iowa Admin. Code 142.6.
The prescribed form includes the following notice to the patient: “To the extent
that it is possible, a person designated by the patient may revoke this order on the
patient’s behalf.  If the patient wishes to authorize any other person(s) to revoke this
order, the patient MUST list those persons’ names below: . . .”  641 Iowa Admin. Code
142 – Appendix A. The form does not have a signature line for the patient or an
individual authorized to act on the patient’s behalf.  The administrative rules and form
contemplate a written order issued by a physician upon oral consent from a competent
adult patient or an individual legally authorized to act on the patient’s behalf.  The form
includes a certification statement above a signature line for the attending physician.  The
physician’s certification verifies consultation with the patient or the patient’s authorized
representative, but does not include any specific statement that the physician has
explained the revocation criteria to the patient or individual authorized to give the
patient’s consent for issuance of the order.
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The administrative rules require that in determining whether an OOH DNR order
should be issued, the attending physician must consult with the patient or a person legally
authorized to act for the patient, such as the patient’s attorney-in-fact or conservator.  If
the consultation is with an adult patient who has previously executed a durable power of
attorney for health care, the patient can easily and effectively supersede a previous
delegation of authority to an attorney-in-fact.  The patient’s oral statement to the
attending physician would be sufficient.  Iowa Code § 144B.8 (2005) (“A durable power
of attorney for health care may be revoked at any time and in any manner . . .”).   The
apparent conflict between section 144A.7A and chapter 144B arises only where there is
no indication that the patient intended that the OOH DNR order supersede a previously-
executed durable power of attorney for health care.
The rules reasonably contemplate that an OOH DNR order can be issued only
upon consent of the patient or an individual authorized to act for the patient.  In
prescribing an OOH DNR form that does not require written consent of the patient, it is
likely that the Department of Public Health took into consideration the absence of any
requirement for written consent in section 144A.7A   However, the rules expressly state
that an OOH DNR order is issued for a “qualified patient.”  641 Iowa Admin. Code
142.3(1).   The term “qualified patient” is defined in Iowa Code section 144A.2(11) to
mean a patient who has “executed” a declaration or an OOH DNR order and has been
determined by an attending physician to be in a terminal condition.  Although the term
“qualified patient” is not used in section 144A.7A, authorizing issuance of an OOH DNR
order, the enabling legislation for OOH DNR orders included  other references to
execution of an OOH DNR order.  For example, the first sentence of Iowa Code section
144A.11(2) previously stated:
The making of a declaration pursuant to section 144A.3 does
not affect in any manner, the sale, procurement, or issuance of
any policy of life insurance, nor shall it be deemed to modify
the terms of an existing policy of life insurance. a condition
of being insured for, or receiving, health care services.
Iowa Code § 144A.11(2) (2001) (emphasis added).  As amended in 2002, the same
subsection now states:
The executing of a declaration pursuant to section 144A.3 or
out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order pursuant to section
144A.7A does not affect in any manner, the sale,
procurement, or issuance of any policy of life insurance, nor
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shall it be deemed to modify the terms of an existing policy of
life insurance, a condition of being insured for, or receiving,
health care services.
2002  Iowa Acts, ch. 1061, § 10 (Emphasis added).  
The word “execute” has several common meanings and does not necessarily
require a written acknowledgment or even a signature on a written document.  A person
may “execute” a task that does not involve any writing.  An OOH DNR order is a
document.  Use of the words “execute” and “executing” in a statute referring to a
document such as a written order strongly implies that a person “executing” the
document should at least sign a consent form on the document.  Considering omission of
the term “qualified patient” from section 144A.7A and its silence concerning consent to
issuance of an OOH DNR order, one might question whether the legislature intended its 
amendment of the definition of “qualified patient” to include the requirement of written
consent for issuance of a OOH DNR order.   We are reluctant to assume such legislative
inadvertence.  See Miller v. Westfield Insurance Co., 606 N.W.2d 301, 305 (Iowa 2000)
(“[A] statute will not be construed to make any part of it superfluous unless no other
construction is reasonably possible.”).  Legislative substitution of the word “executing”
for the word “making” in the amendment of the first sentence of section 144A.11(2) is
inconsistent with such inadvertence.  Although section 144A.7A sets forth certain criteria
for issuance of an OOH DNR, it does not address the issue of consent.  Instead, it
mandates that the Department of Public Health shall prescribe the OOH DNR order form
and adopt administrative rules necessary to implement the statute.   To the extent there is
ambiguity in the relationship between the definition of “qualified patient” in section
144A.2(11), OOH DNR criteria in section 144A.7A, and related provisions in section
144A.11, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of requiring written consent to
issuance of an OOH DNR order.     
 The OOH DNR form should be revised to include signed consent of the patient or
individual authorized to act for the patient, including certification that, notwithstanding
any durable power of attorney for health care that may previously have been executed by
the patient, the patient intends the OOH DNR order to be revoked only by a person
whose name is listed on the order.  These revisions would make the order form consistent
with the requirement in sections 144A.2(11) and 144A.11 that the patient (or individual
legally authorized to act on the patient’s behalf) “execute” the OOH DNR order.  The
revisions would also avoid any misunderstanding concerning intent to supersede a
previous delegation of authority in a durable power of attorney for health care and avoid
the apparent conflict with chapter 144B.
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In summary, we conclude that the holder of a patient’s durable power of attorney
for health care cannot revoke an out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order unless
designated on the out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate order as an individual authorized to
revoke the order.   We reach this conclusion because the limitation of revocation
authorization to the patient and individuals designated in the order is required by the
plain language of Iowa Code section 144A.7A.  To the extent that the provisions of
chapter 144B relating to durable powers of attorney for health care conflict with section
144A.7A, the latter prevails because it is more specific with respect to out-of-hospital 
do-not-resuscitate orders and because it is more recently enacted.  In order to avoid the
conflict between chapters 144A and 144B, we suggest that the form used for out-of-
hospital do-not-resuscitate orders be modified to provide for written consent with
appropriate certification by the patient of intent to supersede the authorization in any
previously-executed durable power of attorney for health care.
Sincerely,
Michael H. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
1Section 359.18 imposes the same duty on the county attorney to represent
township trustees by stating: “In counties having a population of less than twenty-five
thousand, where the trustees institute, or are made parties to, litigation in connection with
the performance of their duties, as provided in this chapter, the county attorney, as a part
of the county attorney's official duties, shall appear in behalf of the township trustees,
except in cases in which the interests of the county and those of the trustees are adverse.” 
Iowa Code 359.18 (emphasis added). 
COUNTY AND COUNTY OFFICERS; EMINENT DOMAIN: Duty of county attorney
to represent township.  Iowa Code sections 6B.2, 331.756, 359.18 (2005).  Iowa Code
section 6B.2(2) imposes a duty on the county attorney to conduct eminent domain
proceedings whenever the damages are payable from funds disbursed by a township
regardless of the population of the county. (Pottorff to Kendell, Warren County Attorney, 
6-29-05) #05-6-2
Mr. Gary W. Kendell
Warren County Attorney
301 N. Buxton, Suite 301
Indianola, Iowa  50125
Dear Mr. Kendell:
Our office is in receipt of your request for an opinion concerning the construction
of statutes that relate to the duties of county attorneys.  You point out that Iowa Code
section 6B.2(2) provides that eminent domain proceedings shall be conducted . . . [b]y
the county attorney, when the damages are payable from funds disbursed by the county,
or by any township, or school corporation.”  Iowa Code § 6B.2(2) (2005) (emphasis
added).  Township trustees, in turn, are empowered to condemn land within the territorial
limits of the township.  Iowa Code § 359.28.  Iowa Code section 331.756(64), by
contrast, provides generally that it is the duty of the county attorney to “[r]epresent the
township trustees in counties having a population of less than twenty-five thousand
except when the interests of the trustees and the county are adverse as provided in section
359.18.”1  Iowa Code § 331.756(64) (emphasis added).  Section 331.756, which was
enacted in 1981within the county home rule act, delineates the basic duties of the county
attorney.  Subsection 66, later renumbered subsection 64, cross references the duty of the
county attorney to represent the township trustees under section 359.18.  1981 Iowa Acts,
69th G.A., ch. 117, § 756(66).
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You ask whether section 6B.2(2) and section 331.756(64) should be construed to
impose a duty on the county attorney to conduct eminent domain proceedings when
damages are payable from funds disbursed by a township only in counties with a
population of less than twenty-five thousand.  We conclude that Iowa Code section
6B.2(2) imposes a duty on the county attorney to conduct eminent domain proceedings
whenever the damages are payable from funds disbursed by a township regardless of the
population of the county.
Iowa Code sections 6B.2(2) and 331.756(64) are in conflict.  Ordinarily, courts
“attempt to harmonize all relevant legislative enactments . . . ‘so as to give meaning to 
all if possible.’” State v. Albrecht, 657 N.W.2d 474, 479 (Iowa 2003) (quoting from  
Messina v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 341 N.W.2d 52, 56 (Iowa 1983)).  But in this
circumstance Iowa Code section 6B.2(2) would impose a duty on the county attorney to
conduct condemnation proceedings in all counties when Iowa Code section 331.756(64)
would limit that duty to counties with a population of less than twenty-five thousand.  
Accordingly, we turn to principles of statutory construction to resolve the conflict.
 
Principles of statutory construction focus on the specific or general nature of the
statutes and the time that each was enacted.  Conflicts between general and specific
statutes are resolved in favor of the specific statute.  Iowa Code § 4.7; Doe v. Ray, 251
N.W.2d 496, 503 (Iowa 1977).  Conflicts between earlier and later enacted statutes are
resolved in favor of the later enacted statute.  Iowa Code § 4.8; Doe v. Ray, 251 N.W.2d
at 503.  
Analyzing the statutes under these principles, it is evident that Iowa Code section
6B.2(2) is the more specific and the later enacted statute.  Section 6B.2(2) imposes a
specific duty on the county attorney to conduct eminent domain proceedings when
damages will be disbursed by a township.  Section 331.756(64) imposes a general duty 
to represent the township trustees, but limits this duty of the county attorney to those
counties having a population of less than twenty-five thousand.  Because section 6B.2(2)
applies particularly to eminent domain while section 331.756(64) applies generally to
representation of township trustees in all matters, section 6B.2(2) is the more specific
statute. 
Further, the duty to conduct eminent domain proceedings is the later enacted
statute.  Although section 331.756(64), about which you specifically inquire, was not
enacted until 1981, the general obligation of the county attorney to represent township
trustees in counties having a population of less than twenty-five thousand actually dates
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2  Due to late adjournment of the extraordinary session of the 40th General
Assembly, “all laws of a permanent and general nature which [did] not take effect by
publication” were omitted from the published session laws and codified immediately 
into the 1924 Code.  See 1924 Iowa Acts, 40th G.A. Ex. Sess., ch. 1, § 1.  Two bound
volumes containing the previously unpublished acts of the extraordinary session were
prepared under the Work Projects Administration (WPA) in 1941.  These volumes, which
include all enrolled bills omitted from the session laws as published, are available at the
law library in the Iowa State Capitol.  Senate File 187 is included as chapter 128, 
at pages 577 through 586.
3 We note that delineation of the basic duties of county attorneys enacted in 1981
included both the duty to “[r]epresent township trustees in counties having a population
of less than twenty-five thousand” and the duty to “[c]onduct legal proceedings relating
to the condemnation of private property as provided in section 472.2.” 1981 Iowa Acts,
69th G.A., ch. 117, §§ 756(66), (70).  Section 472.2 is the statutory predecessor to section
6B.2 and imposed a duty on the county attorney to conduct eminent domain proceedings
when the damages are payable from funds disbursed by a township in language identical
to the current language found in section 6B.2(2).  Iowa Code § 472.2(2) (1981).
to enactment of section 359.18 in 1911.  1911 Iowa Acts, 34th G.A., ch. 31, § 1.  The duty
to conduct eminent domain proceedings when the damages are payable from funds
disbursed by a township was enacted more than ten years later in 1924.  Senate File 187,
40th G.A., Ex. Sess., § 20 (Iowa 1924).2  We consider the duty to conduct eminent
domain proceedings under section 6B.2(2), therefore, to be the later enacted statute.3     
In summary, applying principles of statutory construction, we conclude that Iowa
Code section 6B.2(2) prevails as the more specific and the later enacted statute.  Iowa
Code section 6B.2(2), therefore, imposes a duty on the county attorney to conduct
eminent domain proceedings whenever the damages are payable from funds disbursed 
by a township regardless of the population of the county.
Sincerely,
JULIE F. POTTORFF
Deputy Attorney General
MUNICIPALITIES: Zoning; dual service on planning and zoning commission and board of
adjustment.  Iowa Code §§ 414.6, 414.7, 414.8, 414.9, 414.12 (2005).  A city ordinance
requiring common membership on the planning and zoning commission and board of adjustment
does not necessarily result in a defacto single board.  As long as precautions are taken to ensure
that the two entities continue to operate as separate entities, common membership on the
planning and zoning commission and board of adjustment does not violate chapter 414 and is not
otherwise prohibited by Iowa law.  (Smith to Rants, State Representative, 2-22-05) #05-2-1
February 22, 2005
The Honorable Christopher Rants
Speaker, Iowa House of Representatives
State Capitol
LOCAL
Dear Speaker Rants:
You have requested our opinion concerning whether a city’s appointment of the same
members to both the city planning and zoning commission and board of adjustment violates
Iowa law.  Your request states that, in effect, the council created a defacto “single board”.  It is
our opinion that a city ordinance requiring common membership on the planning and zoning
commission and the board of adjustment does not necessarily result in creation of a defacto 
single board.  If appropriate administrative limitations on combining functions and meetings are
in place, such an ordinance does not violate Iowa law.
In April 2004, the city council of Sioux City amended existing city zoning ordinances to
require common membership of the planning and zoning commission and the board of
adjustment.  The resulting ordinances provide, in pertinent part, that members of the board of
adjustment “shall also be appointed to the planning and zoning commission” and that members
of the planning and zoning commission “shall also be appointed to the board of adjustment.”  On
April 22, 2004, shortly after the council acted, a city planner wrote to members of the preexisting
board of adjustment encouraging them to apply for appointment to the new board.  The planner
characterized the ordinance as replacing the board of adjustment and planning and zoning
commission “with a single board to cover both administrative functions.” 
The members of the defunct board of adjustment wrote this office to complain about the
city’s action in creating a “single board”.  They attached a copy of the ordinance and the April
22, 2004, letter from the city planner.  Later, the city attorney wrote this office, stating that the
complaint from the members of the board of adjustment that the city had created a “single board”
was “totally false”.  The city attorney indicated that “[t]he City Council did not create a single
board to replace the two boards.  What the City Council did do is retain two separate boards with
a common membership.”  The city attorney’s characterization of the effect of the ordinance is
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consistent with the plain language of the ordinance.  The distinction is important.  Thus, we
analyze the legality of a city ordinance providing for common membership on the board of
adjustment and the planning and zoning commission. 
In Iowa, municipal home rule does not extend to city zoning matters, which fall under the
provisions of Iowa Code chapter 414 (2005).  Hawkeye Outdoor Advertising v. Bd. of
Adjustment, 356 N.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Iowa 1984) (city sign ordinance was adopted pursuant to
home rule authority rather than chapter 414 because it did not contain zoning regulations). 
Therefore, we consider the zoning functions of the city council, the planning and zoning
commission, and the board of adjustment, as provided in chapter 414. 
“Zoning is the legislative division of a region, most commonly a city, into separate
districts with different regulations within the districts for land use, building size, etc.”  8 
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.01, at pp. 7-8 (3rd ed. 2000).  The legislative role
of the city council over zoning matters is expressly stated in Iowa statute.  The city council is
designated as the “local legislative body” empowered to divide the city into zoning districts and
adopt uniform regulations and restrictions applicable to each district through enactment of city
zoning ordinances.  Iowa Code § 414.2 (2005).  
In order to regulate the use of property through zoning, the city council must appoint a
zoning commission to recommend to the council zoning district boundaries and appropriate
regulations and must develop the regulations in accordance with a comprehensive plan.  Iowa
Code §§ 414.3, 414.6 (2005).  Neither the size nor membership of the zoning commission is
dictated by statute.  However, where a city planning commission is already in place, the council
is explicitly authorized to combine planning and zoning advisory roles in one commission.  Iowa
Code § 414.6 (2005).  In Iowa, as in most states, the city zoning or planning and zoning
commission is only an advisory body that recommends plans and regulations and amendments to
the city council.  Unlike the city council, the commission acts in an administrative, rather than
legislative capacity.   Iowa Code § 414.6; Anderson v. Jester, 206 Iowa 452, 457, 221 N.W. 354,
357 (1928); 1978 Iowa Op. Atty. Gen. 560, 561 [1978 WL 17425]; 8A MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS, §§ 25.213 at p. 188, 25.224 at pp. 226-27 (3rd ed. 2003).
In contrast to the advisory role of a planning and zoning commission, a board of
adjustment generally has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of administrators, and original
jurisdiction over applications for variances, special exceptions, and nonconforming uses.  8A 
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.228 at pp. 239-40.  In Iowa, the quasi-judicial
functions and powers of the board of adjustment are specified by statute and include: hearing
appeals from zoning decisions made by city administrators, hearing and deciding special
exceptions, and granting variances.  Iowa Code §§ 414.7; 414.12 (2005).  The jurisdiction of the
board of adjustment conferred by sections 414.7 and  414.12 is exclusive and a city ordinance or
other action of a city council is invalid to the extent that it diminishes the statutory authority of
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the board of adjustment.  Holland v. City of Decorah, 662 N.W.2d 681, 682-5 (Iowa 2002),
citing Depue v. City of Clinton, 160 N.W.2d 860, 862 (Iowa 1968).  
As noted above, composition and conduct of the zoning commission or planning and
zoning commission are not specified by section 414.6 or other statute.  Thus, these are matters
within the scope of municipal home rule.  Chapter 414 does, however, dictate the composition of
the board of adjustment and impose procedural requirements for meetings of the board.  Iowa
Code  §§ 414.8 (providing for number of members, length and staggering of terms, and
procedures for removal and filling of vacancies), and 414.9 (requiring open meetings and
minutes of its proceedings, showing the vote of each member on each question) (2005).
Combination of the planning and zoning commission with the board of adjustment is not
expressly prohibited by Iowa Code chapter 414.  We must, however, also consider whether the
statutory scheme in chapter 414 impliedly preempts combination of the two bodies into a single
body.  See, e.g., City of Des Moines v. Gruen, 457 N.W.2d 340, 341-2 (Iowa 1990).  Implied
preemption is suggested by the express authority given to the council in section 414.6 to
combine a city planning commission with the zoning commission.   The roles of the city council,
zoning commission and board of adjustment are all designated in chapter 414, together with
authorization to combine the zoning commission with a city planning commission.  That
authorization could be merely a relic of a more detailed statutory framework predating enactment
of municipal home rule.  Statutes formerly governing city planning commissions were repealed
by 1972 Iowa Acts, ch. 1088, § 199 (city home rule).   But an alternative  interpretation not
rendering the authorization superfluous is that the legislature still viewed the express
authorization to combine zoning and planning commissions as necessary after enactment of
municipal home rule.  See Am. Legion v. Cedar Rapids Bd. of Review, 646 N.W.2d 433, 439
(Iowa 2002) (the court “will not interpret a statute so as to render a part of it superfluous”); State
v. Jeannie Coulter Day Care Nursery, 218 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Iowa 1974) (“[T]he legislature will
be presumed to have inserted every part in a statute for a purpose and to have intended that every
part shall be carried into effect.”)
If the General Assembly had intended to authorize combining of the board of adjustment
and the planning and zoning commission, it could have expressly authorized such combination,
as in Iowa Code sections 414.6 (combination of planning commission and zoning commission
authorized) and 331.323 (authorizing combination of county offices).  In at least one state, the
functions of municipal boards of adjustment have been combined with the functions of municipal
planning and zoning commissions.  8A MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.228, at
p. 242.   Thus, it is highly doubtful whether combining the board of adjustment and the planning
and zoning commission into a single board would be consistent with chapter 414.  However,
because the Sioux City ordinance does not purport to combine the board of adjustment with the
planning and zoning commission we need not resolve this question.  Rather, we focus upon the
provisions in the ordinance which call for common membership on the two bodies. 
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The potential for conflicting functions or duties is an important factor in evaluating
provisions for common membership on two bodies (also described as “dual service of
members”).  See Iowa Op. Att’y Gen # 04-11-1(L) [2004 WL 3190443] (considering dual
service by county supervisors on city/county solid waste agency board); 1982 Iowa Op. Att’y
Gen 156 (#81-6-12(L)) [1981 WL 315315] (concluding that legislator’s dual service on local
transit agency board does not involve a conflict in duties).  It is well settled that the legislative
role of the city council in establishing zoning standards cannot be combined with the quasi-
adjudicatory role of the board of adjustment in applying the standards.  “The application [of
zoning standards] cannot be handled by the legislative body that created the standard without
danger of contravening the separation of powers doctrine.”  Holland v. City of Decorah, 662
N.W.2d 681 at 684 (quoting Depue, 160 N.W.2d 860 at 864 n. 5).  Common membership on the
city council and board of adjustment would violate the required separation of legislative and
adjudicatory duties.  We have also previously concluded that dual service on the city council and
planning and zoning commission constituted incompatible offices because the member serving in
both roles would be approving or disapproving his or her own recommendation.  1978 Op. Atty.
Gen. 560 (#78-6-5) [1978 WL 17425]. 
In comparison, common membership on the board of adjustment and the planning and
zoning commission does not violate the prohibition against combining legislative and
adjudicatory functions.  Nor does it put a member in the position of approving or disapproving
the member’s own recommendation made in service on the other body.  Neither the board of
adjustment nor the planning and zoning commission is required to report to the other body under
the statutory scheme set forth in chapter 414.  The city attorney has suggested that requiring
common membership will allow members of the two bodies to become more familiar with the
relationship between their respective functions (which can be characterized as the “big picture”
and the “small picture” in zoning).  We caution, however, that unless meetings of the two bodies
are carefully separated it will be difficult for the public, as well as staff and the members
themselves, to determine which “hat” the members are wearing as they conduct business.  
We conclude that an ordinance requiring common membership on the board of
adjustment and the planning and zoning commission does not violate Iowa Code chapter 414 and
is not otherwise prohibited.  But our conclusion is conditional.  Members of the board of
adjustment  must be chosen in accordance with the provisions of section 414.8, meetings of the
board must be held in compliance with the requirements of section 414.9, and board authority to
exercise its statutory functions may not be limited.  Unless the functions of the two bodies are
carefully separated, the provision for common membership could result in a blurring of the lines
between actions of the planning and zoning commission and actions of the board of adjustment. 
As discussed above, we believe combination of the commission and the board into a single entity
may run afoul with chapter 414.  Therefore, we advise the council to consider further amending 
The Honorable Christopher C. Rants
Page 5
its ordinances to mandate separate meetings of the commission and the board to better assure
that the distinctions between roles of the two bodies are not eroded to the extent of creation of a
de facto “single board.”
Sincerely,
Michael H. Smith     
Assistant Attorney General
MUNICIPALITIES; CITIES; REAL PROPERTY: Subdivision platting.  Iowa Code 
§§ 354.8, 354.9, 368.7, 368.19 (2005).  A municipal ordinance may condition the city’s
approval of subdivision platting of land within the two-mile extraterritorial area around
the city limits on the property owner’s consent to annexation if the city’s comprehensive
plan shows that the city has planned for development of the land as part of the city’s
growth area and has the capability to extend municipal services such as water and
sanitary sewer that would otherwise not be available to the subdivision.  Annexation of
the land prior to approval of the subdivision may be required if the land is contiguous to
the city.  An agreement to apply for voluntary annexation of the property in the future,
when the property becomes contiguous to the city boundary, may be required if the land
is not currently contiguous to the city.  (Smith to Warnstadt, State Senator, 5-13-05) 
# 05-5-1
May 13, 2005
The Honorable Steve Warnstadt
State Senator
Iowa State Capitol
LOCAL
Dear Senator Warnstadt:
You have requested an opinion concerning the authority of a city to condition
approval of a subdivision plat on the property owner’s consent to annexation of the
property.  You present a series of questions that we paraphrase as follows:
1.  If a city ordinance prohibits approval of the subdivision of land that may
lawfully be annexed to the city based on its location, may the city rely on
the ordinance and Iowa Code section 354.9(2) to condition subdivision
approval on the property owner’s consent to annexation?
2.  If a city ordinance requires all subdivisions to have appropriate
infrastructure and to be served with city-supplied water where available and
the city has a policy of not providing water service outside city limits, may
the city condition approval of an extraterritorial plat on the property
owner’s voluntary annexation of the subdivision into the city –  if the
property is  contiguous to the city boundary – or the property owner’s
agreement to  voluntary annexation of the property in the future when the
property becomes contiguous to the city boundary?
In answer to your questions, we opine that, pursuant to Iowa Code section 354.9, a
municipal ordinance may condition the city’s approval of subdivision platting of land
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within the two-mile extraterritorial area around the city limits on the property owner’s
consent to annexation if the city’s comprehensive plan shows that the city has planned for
development of the land as part of the city’s growth area and has the capability to extend 
municipal services, such as water and sanitary sewer, to the area that would otherwise not
be available to the subdivision.  Annexation of the land prior to approval of the
subdivision may be required if the land is contiguous to the city.  An agreement to apply
for voluntary annexation of the property in the future, when the property becomes
contiguous to the city boundary, may be required if the land is not currently contiguous to
the city.
BACKGROUND: PROBLEMS OF “FRINGE” DEVELOPMENT
Cities and their residents generally are harmed in several different ways by
uncontrolled subdivision development in fringe areas just outside the edges of city
boundaries.  Extension of municipal services in an orderly and efficient manner is
frustrated.  Rural subdivisions with inadequate streets, private wells and septic systems
can be attractive to developers because they are cheaper to develop.  Residents of rural
subdivisions generally resist annexation to avoid higher property taxes and fees for
connecting to municipal water and sewer systems, thus frustrating orderly urban growth. 
See: “Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers,” 24 Urban Lawyer 247, 251-4 (Spring
1992); Op. Att’y Gen. No. 98-1-1 (1998 WL 541519).
Once an area of the city is developed, the cost of change
becomes prohibitive, and it becomes evident that a subdivider
has cast the pattern for the future community.  Since
urbanization of raw land at the city’s edge is now the most
important development area, it is here that the most
significant public influence should be exerted.
“Note, Subdivision Regulation in Iowa,” 54 Iowa L.Rev. 1121, 1122 (1969), quoted in
Oakes Construction Co. v. City of Iowa City, 304 N.W.2d 797, 805 (Iowa 1981).
Clearly, the problems of community development for which solutions are sought
through subdivision control do not terminate at the corporate boundary of the regulating
municipality.  4 Anderson’s American Law of Zoning § 25.06 (4th Ed. 1997).   The
enabling statutes of some states, including Iowa, recognize these problems and seek to
resolve them by giving municipalities authority to regulate the subdivision of land within
a specified distance of corporate limits.  Id.  
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EXTRATERRITORIAL SUBDIVISION REGULATION
Municipal regulation of subdivision plats is authorized by Iowa Code section
354.8 (2005).  The last unnumbered paragraph of the statute authorizes a city to establish
jurisdiction to review subdivisions or plats of survey outside its boundaries pursuant to
section 354.9.  Relevant provisions of section 354.9 include the following authorizations. 
A city that has adopted ordinances regulating the division of land is authorized by section
354.9 to designate, by ordinance specifically referring to section 354.9, an extraterritorial
area subject to the city’s review and approval.  The area of extraterritorial review may not
extend more than two miles from the city’s boundaries. To be effective, the ordinance
designating the extraterritorial review area must be filed with the county recorder and
county auditor.  Iowa Code § 354.9(1) (2005).  “The standards and conditions applied by
a city or county for review and approval of the subdivision shall be the same standards
and conditions used for review and approval of subdivisions within the city limits or shall
be the standards and conditions for review and approval established by agreement of the
city and county pursuant to chapter 28E.”  Iowa Code § 354.9(2).
        The Iowa Supreme Court has adopted a “reasonably liberal reading” of the state
statutes and city ordinances authorizing municipal regulation of subdivision plats,
recognizing the very close relation among municipal planning, zoning and subdivision
control and the importance of zoning and subdivision control for effectuating
comprehensive land-use plans.  Oakes, 304 N.W.2d at 806.  Under the liberal approach, a
platting authority has the flexibility to disapprove plats or condition approval for reasons
that are not “spelled out in so many words” in the governing statutes or ordinances. 
Blumenthal Investment Trusts v. City of West Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255, 267 (Iowa
2001).
In previous opinions, we have addressed several issues relating to a city’s extra-
territorial regulatory authority over subdivision plats.  We have advised that both a
county and a city by ordinance may provide reasonable standards and conditions
affecting proposed subdivisions within the city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.  1994 Iowa
Op. Att’y Gen. 142 [# 94-9-4(L)] (1994 WL 601538).  We have advised that, pursuant to
sections 354.8 and 354.9, a city can require subdivision platting within an area of its
extraterritorial jurisdiction when neither state law nor county ordinance requires such
platting.  Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. # 98-1-1(L) (1998 WL 541519).   Finally, we have opined
that municipal home rule authorizes agreements through which landowner-developers act
for themselves and their successors in consenting to annexation if the land becomes
adjacent to the city.  Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. # 00-12-1 (2000 WL 33258480).
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CONDITIONING ANNEXATION CONSENT:
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The question whether subdivision plat approval can be conditioned on consent to
annexation requires analysis of the relationship between municipal authority to regulate
extraterritorial subdivision platting and municipal authority to annex territory.  The law
of annexation is purely statutory.  Pruss v. Cedar Rapids/Hiawatha Annexation Special
Local Committee, 687 N.W.2d 275 (Iowa 2004).  A state may expand or contract the
territorial area of its cities with or without the consent of its citizens, unrestrained by the
Unites States Constitution.  Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79, 28 S.Ct.
40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907).   See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71, 99
S.Ct. 383, 390, 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978).
State constitutional provisions and statutory annexation frameworks vary among
jurisdictions.  Although state statutes establishing annexation methods need not include
any right to vote, the statutory establishment of voting rights on annexation proposals
may trigger strict judicial scrutiny of provisions in state statutes or municipal ordinances
that interfere with those voting rights.  In constitutional challenges against annexation
statutes or municipal ordinances that condition extraterritorial services or plat approval
on annexation consent, the result largely depends on the role of voting under the state’s
annexation statutes or the state’s constitution.  The interplay between state-mandated
annexation elections and judicial scrutiny of alternative annexation methods has been
analyzed by courts in several jurisdictions.  
In some states, a petition of a majority of voters in a territory is required for
annexation.  For example, a Wisconsin annexation statute provides that “[n]o populated
fringe area may become part of the city until the majority of electors and/or property
owners in a particular area desire to annex.”   Hoepker v. City of Madison Plan
Commission, 209 Wis. 2d 633, 646, 563 N.W.2d 145, 150 (1997) [citations omitted].  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Hoepker that the City of Madison violated
safeguards in Wisconsin’s annexation statutes by requiring landowners to petition for
annexation as a condition of obtaining approval of a subdivision plat for property
adjoining the city.  Hoepker, 209 Wis. 2d at 645-49, 563 N.W.2d at 150-52.  The ruling
in Hoepker followed an earlier decision in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court
analogized the annexation petition process to an election.  Town of Fond du Lac v. City of
Fond du Lac, 22 Wis.2d 533, 536-40, 126 N.W.2d 201 (1964) (invalidating annexation
where annexing city obtained agreement of landlord to obtain consent of tenants and city
obtained consents of residents by inducements and eviction threats). 
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An opinion of our Supreme Court has mentioned Hoepker without any comment
concerning whether the Hoepker rationale has any relevance in Iowa.  Blumenthal
Investment Trusts v. City of West Des Moines, 636 N.W.2d 255, 267 (Iowa 2001)
(rejecting claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that application of municipal subdivision platting
ordinance violated developer’s right to substantive due process).  In evaluating whether
Hoepker and Town of Fond du Lac have any relevance under Iowa law we must consider
similarities and differences between the statutory annexation frameworks in Iowa,
Wisconsin, and other states whose appellate courts have analyzed the Wisconsin cases. 
In Oregon, like Wisconsin, a “double majority” of landowners and voters in a
territory must consent to annexation.   In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 by
homeowners residing outside a city, a federal appellate court held a municipal ordinance
violated equal protection rights under the United States Constitution by requiring the
nonresidents to consent to annexation as a condition of a subsidy or reduction in hook-up
costs for mandated sewer connections.  Hussey v. City of Portland, 64 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1112, 116 S.Ct. 911, 133 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996).  The court
considered alternative annexation methods provided by Oregon statutes, including an
election or written consent of a majority of all voters registered in the territory and
owners of all land in the territory.  Without consent of a double majority of registered
voters and landowners, Portland would have had to conduct an election to annex the
territory.  Further, the consent forms used by Portland stated that if the city attempted to
annex the territory by election, the agreement would constitute a waiver of the right to
vote and would count as a “yes” vote.  64 F.3d at 1262-63.   Distinguishing decisions by
federal appellate courts in other federal circuits, the court relied on the rationale of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Town of Fond du Lac.  The court ruled that because in
Oregon, like Wisconsin, the annexation by petition of voters in the territory was an
alternative to election, the municipal ordinance affected voting rights.  64 F.3d at 1264-
65.  The court relied also on Curtis v. Bd. of Supr’s of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal.3d 942,
501 P.2d 537 (1972) (invalidating state statute that authorized owners of property with
51% of total assessed value to prevent an annexation election).  In Hussey, the federal
court concluded that the Portland ordinance severely and unreasonably interfered with
the right to vote, triggering application of a strict scrutiny test that Portland conceded the
ordinance could not satisfy.  64 F.3d at 1265-66.    
   
Hussey was distinguished by the Court of Appeals of Oregon in an action for
judicial review of a state administrative order requiring the owner of a commercial
business to connect to the sanitary sewer system of an adjoining city, which required
consent to annexation as a condition of the sanitary sewer connection.  In Jeld-Wen, Inc.
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v. Environmental Quality Comm., 162 Or. App. 100, 986 P.2d 582 (1999), the court
rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Hussey finding that because the petitioner was not a
voter and no voters lived on the petitioner’s property the EQC policy requiring use of the
centralized sewer system and annexation in order to access that system in no way
infringed upon anyone’s voting rights.  162 Or. App. at 110,  986 P.2d at 588. 
Appellate courts in Arizona have distinguished both Town of Fond du Lac and
Hussey because Arizona’s annexation statutes do not provide for annexation by election
or by petition of resident voters in a territory.   In Goodyear Farms v. City of Avondale,
148 Ariz. 216, 714 P.2d 386 (1986), the Arizona Supreme Court rejected an equal
protection challenge to Arizona’s annexation statute.  The Court distinguished Town of
Fond du Lac, quoting from  a subsequent Wisconsin appellate opinion that explained the
distinction between consent of landowners and consent of voters:
Ownership itself, detached from the personal benefits or
detriments that accompany residency in a municipality, is
more of a private right than the political right a resident may
have in annexation. . . . The two types of interests are treated
differently because they are different.  Thus the political
nature of annexation petitions recognized as applicable to
electors in De Bauche v. Green Bay, 227 Wis. 148, 153-54,
277 N.W. 147 (1938) and Fond Du Lac is not applicable to
property owners.
Goodyear Farms, 148 Ariz. at 220, 714 P.2d at 390, quoting Town of Medary v. City of
La Crosse, 88 Wis.2d 101, 105, 277 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Wis. App. 1979).  The Goodyear
Farms Court concluded, “[w]e do not believe that the Arizona annexation petition
process, which is signed by property owners, would be a political right analogous to
voting.”  Id.
Hussey was subsequently distinguished by the Arizona Court of Appeals in an
opinion rejecting constitutional challenges to an Arizona statute giving a city the power
to prohibit incorporation of any new city within its statutorily defined “urbanized area.”  
The court explained that because the Arizona legislature had determined that the issue of
municipal incorporation in defined areas would not be decided by an election at all, the
process through which landowners could petition for incorporation did not “equate to an
election.”  City of Tucson v. Pima County, 199 Ariz. 509, 517-20, 19 P.3d 650, 658-61
(Ariz. App. 2001).
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Both Hussey and Town of Fond du Lac were also distinguished by the Washington
Supreme Court in consolidated cases involving property owner and fire district
challenges to Washington statutes authorizing annexation by petition of owners of
properties constituting specified percentages of the assessed value in the annexation
territory.  The petitions resulting in the challenged annexations were obtained by the
cities through “outside utility agreements” by which the cities extended utility services
conditioned on consent to annexation.   Grant County Fire Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses
Lake, 145 Wash.2d 702, 42 P.3d 394 (2002) [Grant County I].  Under the Washington
statutory scheme considered by the court, the petition method of annexation was an
alternative to an election method in which a majority of residents vote to annex a
particular property to a city.  The court distinguished Hussey because the Oregon method
for annexation by petition required a double majority of both property owners and voters
in the territory to be annexed.  The court also rejected the analogy between annexation by
petition and voting set forth in Town of Fond du Lac, noting that courts in several
jurisdictions had rejected the analogy.  145 Wash.2d 720-23, 42 P.3d 403-04.  The court
rejected equal protection challenges to the statutory scheme, but the majority held that it
violated the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington Constitution.  On
rehearing, the court vacated that portion of its decision and upheld the constitutionality of 
the annexation statute.  Grant County Fire Dist. No. 5 v. City of Moses Lake, 150
Wash.2d 791, 83 P.3d 419 (2004) [Grant County II].   
Iowa statutes also provide alternate methods of annexation.   A city may annex
territory by involuntary annexation, a process which culminates in an election.  See Iowa
Code §§ 368.11 – 368.20 (2005).   When an election to approve an involuntary
annexation proposal is held, “registered voters of the [annexation] territory and of the
city may vote, and the proposal is authorized if a majority of the total number of persons
voting approves it.”  Iowa Code § 368.19 (emphasis added).  A city may also annex
territory by voluntary annexation upon application of the owners of the property in the
annexation territory.  Iowa Code § 368.7 (2005).  Territory comprising not more than
twenty percent of the land area may be included in the application without the consent of
the owner to avoid creating an island or to create more uniform boundaries.  Iowa Code 
§ 368.7(1)(a) (2005).
Iowa’s annexation statutes differ from Wisconsin’s and Oregon’s, the two states in
which courts have found a requirement of consent to annexation as a condition for
approval of an otherwise extraterritorial subdivision to be unconstitutional.  Unlike the
annexation statutes in those two states, Iowa Code chapter 368 does not give a majority
of electors residing in a proposed annexation territory a veto over either a voluntary or
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involuntary annexation.   Involuntary annexations are approved, not upon a majority vote
of the electors in the territory to be annexed, but upon a majority of the total combined
votes cast in the annexation territory and the city proposing annexation.  Thus, electors in
the proposed annexation area do not control the outcome of an election for approval of an
involuntary annexation.  See City of Altoona v. Sandquist, 230 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Iowa
1975) (holding that Iowa Code section 362.26 (1971), a predecessor to current Code
section 368.19, was only intended to extend franchise to residents of an annexation area,
not “to grant those persons a veto power over annexation”).  Even in the context of
voluntary annexations, consent of residents is not required under the Iowa statutes. 
Rather, voluntary annexations in Iowa require only consent of property owners.  
Because property owners, rather than resident electors, control voluntary
annexation decisions, an ordinance making subdivision plat approval conditional on
consent to annexation does not affect voting rights.  Therefore, if challenged on
constitutional equal protection or substantive due process grounds, such an ordinance
would be subjected a rational basis test rather than the strict scrutiny test applied to a
statute or ordinance which infringes upon voting rights.  
 
Given application of the “rational basis test” and the “reasonably liberal”
construction to be given by Iowa courts to statutes and ordinances authorizing municipal
subdivision regulations, we believe that a court would find that a city ordinance may
condition approval of an extraterritorial subdivision plan upon the property owner’s
consent to annexation.  However, we hesitate to opine that such an ordinance would be
found reasonable and within the scope of authority granted by sections 354.8 and 354.9
in all circumstances.  A challenge to the validity of a city’s subdivision ordinances and
decisions of the council acting pursuant to the ordinances are resolved by the courts
based upon consideration of the specific terms of the ordinance, the facts and
circumstances surrounding application of the ordinance, and the rationale given for the
city’s decision.  C.f.  Carruthers v. Board of Supervisors, Polk County, 646 N.W.2d 867
(Iowa Ct. App. 2002) (upholding denial of subdivision plat approval based upon local
board consideration facts and circumstances).  Inquiry into the validity of a specific
ordinance requirement is necessarily fact-based and outside the scope of our opinion
process.  See 61 Iowa Admin. Code 1.5(13)(c). 
However, in circumstances where the land is shown as a growth area in the city’s
comprehensive plan and services of the annexing city such as water or sanitary sewer are
available and needed to better assure adequate infrastructure for the subdivision, we
believe that an ordinance conditioning subdivision plat approval on consent to annexation
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to receive those services would likely be upheld as reasonable and within the scope of
sections 354.8 and 354.9.  We note that municipal ordinances conditioning extension of
extraterritorial utility services on consent to annexation generally have been upheld in
other jurisdictions in circumstances where annexation voting rights were not implicated. 
See, e.g., Grant County, 150 Wash.2d 791, 83 P.3d 419 (2004) [Grant County II];
Yakima County Fire Protection Dist. No. 12 v. City of Yakima, 122 Wash. 2d 371, 858
P.2d 245 (1993); Johnson v. City of La Grande, 167 Or.App. 35, 1 P.3d 1036 (Or.App.
2000) (distinguishing Hussey); Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Environmental Quality Comm., 162 Or.
App. 100, 986 P.2d 582 (1999) (also distinguishing Hussey); Vine St. Comm. Prtnrshp. v.
City of Maryville, 989 P.2d 1238 (Wash.App. 2000) (invalidating retroactive enforcement
of ordinance); Andres v. City of Perrysburg, 47 Ohio App.3d 51, 546 N.E.2d 1377
(1988).
Your inquiry distinguishes between the situation in which land to be subdivided is
contiguous to city boundaries and the situation in which land is within the extraterritorial
area regulated by the city but not contiguous to the city boundary.  When land proposed
for subdivision is contiguous to the city annexation may be accomplished prior to
approval of a subdivision plan.  When the land is not contiguous annexation is not a
current option.  You ask whether a city may condition subdivision plat approval or the
provision of city services upon the property owner signing an agreement to voluntarily
annex the property in the future, when it is contiguous to the city.  This office previously
examined this type of agreement and concluded that – if the agreement was properly
recorded so that subsequent purchasers had actual or constructive notice – it would be
binding upon successor property owners.  Iowa Op. Att’y Gen. # 00-12-1 (2000 WL
33258480).  In light of the 2000 opinion and our analysis herein, we conclude that a city
may require an agreement for future annexation prior to approval of a subdivision or the
provision of municipal services and that the agreement, if properly recorded, would likely
be enforceable against landowner parties to the agreement and subsequent purchasers of
property covered by the agreement.
     
In summary, we conclude that, pursuant to Iowa Code section 354.9, a municipal
ordinance may condition the city’s approval of subdivision platting of land within the
two-mile extraterritorial area around the city limits on the property owner’s consent to
annexation if the city’s comprehensive plan shows that the city has planned for
development of the land as part of the city’s growth area and has the capability to extend
municipal services such as water and sanitary sewer that would otherwise not be
available to the subdivision.  Annexation of the land prior to approval of the subdivision
may be required if the land is contiguous to the city.  An agreement to apply for
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voluntary annexation of the property in the future, when the property becomes
contiguous to the city boundary, may be required if the land is not currently contiguous to
the city.
  Sincerely,
Michael H. Smith
Assistant Attorney General
